United States

Securities and Exchange Commission

Washington, D.C. 20549

FORM 6-K

Report of Foreign Private Issuer

Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16

under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

May 1829, 2026

Commission File Number 001-37791

COCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC

Pemberton House, Bakers Road

Uxbridge, UB8 1EZ, United Kingdom

(Address of principal executive office)

(Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F.)

(Check One) Form 20-F ý Form 40-F D ¨

~~Coca-Cola~~29 ~~Europacific~~May ~~Partners plc (CCEP or the Company)~~2026

18Coca-Cola ~~May~~Europacific Partners plc – Results of 2026 Annual General Meeting

~~Dear~~The ~~Shareholder~~Annual General Meeting of Coca-Cola Europacific Partners plc: (the “Company”) was held at 1A Wimpole Street, London, W1G 0EA, United Kingdom on 28 May 2026.

WeAll ~~are~~31 ~~asking~~resolutions ~~for~~put ~~your~~to ~~support~~the inmembers ~~voting~~were ~~“FOR”~~passed ~~all~~on ~~resolutions~~a poll. Accordingly, asresolutions ~~recommended~~1 byto ~~the~~26 ~~Board~~were ofpassed ~~Directors,~~as atordinary ~~our~~resolutions ~~upcoming~~and ~~Annual~~resolutions ~~General~~27 ~~Meeting~~to on31 28were ~~May~~passed ~~2026~~as special resolutions.

WeThe ~~are~~results ~~writing to provide additional context regarding certain resolutions set out in our notice~~ of ~~meeting dated 16 April 2026 (~~the ~~Notice~~polls ofare ~~Meeting). Specifically, we would like to supplement information in Resolution 25 (Waiver of mandatory offer provisions~~ set out ~~in Rule 9 of the Takeover Code), Resolution 7 (regarding the re-election of Manolo Arroyo) and Resolution 9 (regarding the re-election of José Ignacio Comenge).~~below:

A number of our shareholders will have received proxy advisory service reports from Glass Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis), Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Institutional Voting Information Service (IVIS). While Glass Lewis recommends a “FOR” vote in respect of each resolution, ISS recommends voting “AGAINST" Resolutions 7, 9 and 25 and IVIS has given a “RED” designation in respect of Resolution 25.


Resolution		For (see note 1)		Against (see note 1)		Issued share capital represented by votes (see note 2) %	Votes withheld (see note 3)
		Votes	%	Votes	%
1	Receipt of the Report and Accounts	406,482,347	99.90%	407,236	0.10%	91.80%	247,725
2	Approval of the Directors' Remuneration Policy	400,476,791	98.39%	6,538,197	1.61%	91.83%	122,320
3	Approval of the Directors' Remuneration Report	403,059,719	99.03%	3,962,515	0.97%	91.83%	115,074
4	Election of Laurence Debroux as a director of the Company	406,762,348	99.93%	268,359	0.07%	91.84%	106,601
5	Election of Uvashni Raman as a director of the Company	406,739,581	99.93%	289,245	0.07%	91.83%	108,482
6	Re-election of Robert Appleby as a director of the Company	406,375,776	99.84%	655,756	0.16%	91.84%	105,776
7	Re-election of Manolo Arroyo as a director of the Company	356,719,567	87.77%	49,710,058	12.23%	91.70%	707,683
8	Re-election of John Bryant as a director of the Company	399,587,893	98.17%	7,440,596	1.83%	91.83%	108,819
9	Re-election of José Ignacio Comenge as a director of the Company	356,216,448	87.64%	50,230,043	12.36%	91.70%	690,817
10	Re-election of Sol Daurella as a director of the Company	395,397,538	97.19%	11,432,067	2.81%	91.79%	307,703
11	Re-election of Damian Gammell as a director of the Company	406,099,818	99.77%	943,569	0.23%	91.84%	93,921

We are firmly committed to good governance and transparency for our shareholders. We believe the information provided below will assist you in better understanding our recommendations.

Unless stated otherwise, defined terms used in this letter have the same meaning as in the Notice of Meeting.

Resolution 25 (Waiver of mandatory offer provisions set out in Rule 9 of the Takeover Code)

As set out above, the report from Glass Lewis recommends a vote "FOR" Resolution 25, whilst the report from ISS recommends a vote "AGAINST" Resolution 25. Glass Lewis and ISS have recommended voting "FOR" Resolutions 29 and 30 (Authority to purchase own shares). The report from IVIS has given a “RED” designation in relation to Resolution 25, while also recognising that the voting decision should be a matter for shareholder judgment.

Resolution 25 is a standing item at each Annual General Meeting of the Company to enable CCEP to give effect to Resolutions 29 and 30. Therefore, a share repurchase cannot occur unless Resolution 25 is approved and a vote “AGAINST” Resolution 25 will have the same effect as a vote “AGAINST” Resolutions 29 and 30.


12	Re-election of Nathalie Gaveau as a director of the Company	404,583,410	99.40%	2,429,902	0.60%	91.83%	123,996
13	Re-election of Álvaro Gómez-Trénor Aguilar as a director of the Company	403,977,573	99.30%	2,861,683	0.70%	91.79%	298,052
14	Re-election of Mary Harris as a director of the Company	399,637,873	98.18%	7,394,629	1.82%	91.84%	104,806
15	Re-election of Alfonso Líbano Daurella as a director of the Company	403,959,826	99.29%	2,878,878	0.71%	91.79%	298,604
16	Re-election of Nicolas Mirzayantz as a director of the Company	403,996,474	99.25%	3,033,232	0.75%	91.84%	107,602
17	Re-election of Mark Price as a director of the Company	403,545,563	99.14%	3,486,285	0.86%	91.84%	105,460
18	Re-election of Nancy Quan as a director of the Company	403,837,610	99.27%	2,983,316	0.73%	91.79%	316,382
19	Re-election of Mario Rotllant Solá as a director of the Company	402,930,232	99.04%	3,907,207	0.96%	91.79%	299,869
20	Re-election of Dessi Temperley as a director of the Company	406,551,287	99.88%	480,233	0.12%	91.84%	105,788
21	Reappointment of the Auditor	412,791,518	99.89%	469,606	0.11%	93.24%	126,315
22	Remuneration of the Auditor	406,971,413	99.99%	60,935	0.01%	91.84%	104,960
23	Political donations	405,971,063	99.77%	943,264	0.23%	91.81%	222,981
24	Authority to allot new shares	401,917,119	98.74%	5,114,455	1.26%	91.84%	105,734
25	Waiver of mandatory offer provisions set out in Rule 9 of the Takeover Code (see note 5)	177,687,226	75.39%	58,009,286	24.61%	53.18%	171,440,796
26	Amendment to the Coca-Cola Europacific Partners plc Long Term Incentive Plan	404,311,107	99.35%	2,663,411	0.65%	91.82%	162,790
27	General authority to disapply pre-emption rights	405,902,986	99.75%	1,023,467	0.25%	91.81%	210,855
28	General authority to disapply pre-emption rights in connection with an acquisition or specified capital investment	406,501,699	99.88%	479,412	0.12%	91.82%	156,197

Resolution 25 seeks approval from the Independent Shareholders of a waiver under Rule 9 of the Takeover Code. Rule 9 applies when any entity holds 30% or more of the voting rights of a company. When a company purchases its own voting shares, any resulting increase in the percentage of shares carrying voting rights will be an acquisition for the purpose of Rule 9. CCEP currently has one shareholder, Olive, which owns approximately 37.2% of the issued share capital of CCEP and so any share repurchase would automatically trigger Rule 9 and result in an obligation on Olive to make a general offer to shareholders for all the remaining equity share capital of CCEP. Olive has owned in excess of 34% of the share capital of CCEP since CCEP’s formation in 2016 and its percentage holding has only modestly increased since then.

Rule 9 of the Takeover Code acts as a safeguard to shareholders and the Panel has already reviewed and agreed, subject to the Independent Shareholders’ approval, to waive the application of Rule 9.

However, ISS is still recommending voting against Resolution 25, as it has every year for the past ten years. The ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines for the United Kingdom & Ireland states, “In line with the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA), ISS will usually recommend a vote against Rule 9 waivers.”[1] However, beginning in 2020, the PLSA changed its policy on Rule 9 waivers to remove language explicitly stating that shareholders would normally vote against Rule 9 waiver resolutions made in connection with share buybacks. The 2019 PLSA Stewardship and Voting Guidelines for resolutions seeking share buybacks stated, “Shareholders would normally vote against the resolution proposing a waiver of Rule 9 of the Takeover Code.”[2] However, from 2020 the PLSA Guidelines stated, “Investors should consider voting against a resolution for share buybacks if: “the resolution proposes a waiver of Rule 9 of the Takeover Code [and] the buy-back is not deemed a prudent use of the company’s cash resources, is not supported by cash flows of the underlying business and introduces excessive and unsustainable leverage”[3] (emphasis added). We understand that ISS has still not updated its own policy to reflect this change.

[1] See ISS 2026 Proxy Voting Guidelines for United Kingdom and Ireland. https://www.iss-stoxx.com/file/policy/current/emea/uk-and-ireland-voting-guidelines.pdf

[2] See 2019 PLSA Stewardship and Voting Guidelines. https://plsauat.cantarusdev.com/Portals/0/Documents/Policy-Documents/2019/CG_Voting%20Guidelines%202019%20FINAL.pdf

[3] See 2020 PLSA Stewardship and Voting Guidelines. https://plsauat.cantarusdev.com/Portals/0/Documents/Policy-Documents/2020/PLSA-Stewardship-Guide-and-Voting-Guidelines-180220.pdf

As shareholders will be aware, CCEP announced a share buyback programme on 17 February 2026, pursuant to which the Company expects to repurchase up to €1bn of ordinary shares (in aggregate) across certain US and UK trading venues in the period to February 2027 (subject to market conditions). A shareholder vote in favour of resolutions 25, 29 and 30 respectively is required for CCEP to continue this programme.


29	Authority to purchase own shares on market	403,732,454	99.21%	3,208,970	0.79%	91.82%	195,884
30	Authority to purchase own shares off market	403,713,015	99.21%	3,218,917	0.79%	91.81%	205,376
31	Notice period for general meetings other than annual general meetings	399,762,665	98.22%	7,261,540	1.78%	91.83%	113,103

~~CCEP~~The isresults ~~comfortable~~for ~~that~~the itelection ~~would~~and ~~only~~re-election ~~effect~~of aindependent ~~share~~non-executive ~~buyback~~directors, ~~under~~excluding the ~~authority~~votes ~~sought~~cast ifby ~~the~~Olive ~~buyback~~Partners, ~~was~~S.A. ~~supported~~as by the Company’s ~~cash~~controlling ~~flows~~shareholder, ~~and~~are ~~would~~set ~~not~~out ~~introduce~~below ~~excessive~~(see ~~and~~note ~~unsustainable leverage.~~ 4):

We believe ISS’s methodology does not take into account our stated rationale or Olive’s stated intentions, which have not changed since Olive entered into the Shareholders’ Agreement with us.


Resolution		For (see note 4)		Against (see note 4)		Issued share capital represented by votes%	Votes withheld (see note 3)
		Votes	%	Votes	%
4	Election of Laurence Debroux as a director of the Company	240,633,362	99.89%	268,359	0.11%	54.35%	106,601
5	Election of Uvashni Raman as a director of the Company	240,610,595	99.88%	289,245	0.12%	54.35%	108,482
6	Re-election of Robert Appleby as a director of the Company	240,246,790	99.73%	655,756	0.27%	54.35%	105,776
8	Re-election of John Bryant as a director of the Company	233,458,907	96.91%	7,440,596	3.09%	54.35%	108,819
12	Re-election of Nathalie Gaveau as a director of the Company	238,454,424	98.99%	2,429,902	1.01%	54.35%	123,996
14	Re-election of Mary Harris as a director of the Company	233,508,887	96.93%	7,394,629	3.07%	54.35%	104,806
16	Re-election of Nicolas Mirzayantz as a director of the Company	237,867,488	98.74%	3,033,232	1.26%	54.35%	107,602

Whilst IVIS has given Resolution 25 a “RED” designation and noted that it is a matter for shareholder judgement in light of the potential for Olive’s shareholding to increase, the report from IVIS goes on to acknowledge the Company’s justifications in respect of Resolution 25 and we believe that the points raised are addressed by Olive’s stated intentions and the fulsome disclosure in the Notice of Meeting.

In the Notice of Meeting, Olive confirmed that it has no intention of changing its approach to CCEP as a result of any increase in its shareholding due to any share repurchase. It has no intention to seek any change to the general nature or any other aspect of the Company's business.

Currently, Olive holds approximately 37.2% of the issued share capital of CCEP. If CCEP were to repurchase all the Ordinary Shares for which it is seeking the Buyback Authorities, Olive’s maximum potential shareholding would increase to approximately 41.4%. We note that completion of the current announced share buyback programme (at the prevailing CCEP share price) is expected to result in substantially less than 10% of the Company’s share capital being acquired.

Additionally, regardless of the outcome of these resolutions, Olive’s shareholding would not carry more than 50% of such voting rights, and any further increase in its shareholding will be subject to the provisions of Rule 9 of the Takeover Code.

Given Olive’s stated position, as well as the regulatory safeguards the Panel already has in place, we believe that ISS’s concerns over “creeping control” are therefore unfounded, and that ISS’s recommendation against Resolution 25 is unwarranted.


17	Re-election of Mark Price as a director of the Company	237,416,577	98.55%	3,486,285	1.45%	54.35%	105,460
20	Re-election of Dessi Temperley as a director of the Company	240,422,301	99.80%	480,233	0.20%	54.35%	105,788

~~Glass Lewis agrees with our recommendation. The report from Glass Lewis states~~Notes:

•“In this case, following a repurchase of shares or exercising of options, the concert party may increase their ownership stake in the Company but may not gain control of it without triggering a full takeover bid. Further, shareholders should note that the waiver will not apply to an acquisition of ordinary shares.


1			Votes “For” and “Against” are expressed as a percentage of votes received.
2			As at 11:30am on Tuesday 26 May 2026, the time by which shareholders who wanted to attend, speak and vote at the AGM must have been entered on the Company’s register of members, there were 443,217,637 ordinary shares in issue.
3			A “Vote Withheld” is not a vote in law and is not counted in the calculation of the proportion of votes “For” or “Against” a resolution.
4			Under the UK Listing Rules (the “UKLR”), Olive Partners, S.A. (“Olive”) is treated as a “controlling shareholder” of the Company (that is, it exercises or controls more than 30% of the voting rights of the Company). In accordance with UKLR 6.2.5R, the election and re-election of CCEP’s independent non-executive directors must be conducted in accordance with UKLR 6.2.8R and 6.2.9R. Accordingly, the votes by CCEP’s shareholders excluding Olive and its presumed concert parties (the “Independent Shareholders”) in respect of resolutions 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17 and 20 have been counted and set out separately to determine whether these resolutions have been approved by a majority of the Independent Shareholders.
5			Resolution 25 was put to the AGM as a resolution of the Independent Shareholders

~~•This~~Resolution ~~proposal~~25, ~~does~~being ~~not~~the ~~appear~~ordinary ~~connected~~resolution to approve the waiver by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers under Rule 9 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Rule 9 Waiver”) in connection with ~~any~~the ~~sort~~Company’s buyback programme, was duly passed by 75.39% of ~~takeover~~the ~~attempt~~votes cast by ~~this~~the ~~party,~~Independent Shareholders with 24.61% of votes cast against. Resolution 25 is a standing agenda item at each Annual General Meeting to enable CCEP to exercise the authorities under resolution 29 to purchase its own shares on market and ~~thus~~resolution 30 to purchase its own shares off market, itwhich ~~should~~were ~~not~~both ~~warrant~~passed ~~shareholder~~with ~~concern~~majorities atof ~~this~~99.21%. ~~time~~This will enable CCEP to make use of the option to return value to shareholders through a possible future buyback programme. ~~However~~Had resolution 25 not been passed, the ~~concert~~Company ~~party's~~would ~~beneficial~~not ~~ownership~~have ~~will~~been ~~continue~~able to beeffect ~~monitored~~such buyback programmes, as explained in the ~~future~~Notice ~~application~~ of ~~the~~AGM ~~Benchmark~~and ~~Policy~~also in the ~~event~~Letter ~~that~~to aShareholders ~~takeover~~issued ~~attempt~~via ~~becomes~~RNS ~~more~~on ~~likely~~18 May 2026.

~~•We~~CCEP intends to continue to engage with ISS on their standing policy to generally recommend ~~that~~a vote against Rule 9 waivers, which we believe may be a contributing factor in influencing investor decisions in this regard. In addition, CCEP will continue to engage, in the normal course and as appropriate, with shareholders who did not support resolution 25 to understand the reasons for their vote ~~FOR~~against ~~this~~the proposal and to continue a transparent and constructive dialogue on this topic.” In accordance with provision 4 of the UK Corporate Governance Code, the Company will publish an update on this

We also believe that IVIS’s concerns with regard to the potential increase in Olive’s shareholding, reflected by its “RED” designation in respect of Resolution 25, are sufficiently addressed by the steps taken by the Company to engage with its shareholders on this topic, the benefits to the Company that accrue as a result of Resolution 25 (both as acknowledged in the IVIS report) and Olive’s stated intentions in respect of the Company.

The CCEP Board and management firmly believe these resolutions are in the best interests of Shareholders as they provide the ability to return cash to Shareholders, enabling CCEP to continue to deliver long-term shareholder value. Accordingly, the Board and management of CCEP recommend voting “FOR” Resolutions 25, 29 and 30, consistent with the recommendations of Glass Lewis.

Resolution 7 (re-election of Manolo Arroyo) and Resolution 9 (re-election of José Ignacio Comenge)

The report issued by Glass Lewis recommends voting “FOR” Resolution 7 (the re-election of Manolo Arroyo) and Resolution 9 (the re-election of José Ignacio Comenge). The report generated by ISS notes that its policy requires remuneration committees to be comprised solely of independent directors. It therefore recommends a vote “AGAINST” the re-election of Mr Arroyo and Mr Comenge as non-independent members of CCEP’s Remuneration Committee.

~~The~~engagement, ~~ISS~~in ~~2026~~accordance ~~Benchmark~~with ~~Report for CCEP states that a vote AGAINST~~ the ~~re-election~~UK ofCorporate ~~Manolo~~Governance ~~Arroyo and José Ignacio Comenge is warranted because “potential independence issues have been identified and they currently sit on the Remuneration Committee~~Code, ~~preventing~~within ~~the~~six ~~composition~~months of ~~this~~the ~~Committee~~2026 ~~from~~AGM ~~adhering~~and ~~to UK best practice recommendations for~~ a ~~company~~final ofsummary ~~this~~in ~~size.”[4]~~the ~~According to ISS’~~Company's ~~own~~Annual ~~calculations,~~Report ~~our~~for ~~Remuneration~~the ~~Committee~~2026 ~~consists~~Financial ~~of 60% of independent directors~~Year.

~~Both~~Olive Mris ~~Arroyo~~currently interested in 166,128,987 shares in the Company and Mrthe ~~Comenge~~Rule ~~are~~9 ~~shareholder~~Waiver ~~representatives.~~does Mrnot ~~Arroyo~~entitle isOlive ~~Executive~~to ~~Vice~~be ~~President~~interested ~~and~~in ~~Global~~a ~~Chief~~greater ~~Marketing~~number ~~Officer~~of atshares. The ~~Coca-Cola~~Rule ~~Company,~~9 ~~the~~Waiver ~~parent~~would ~~company~~allow ofOlive’s ~~European~~interest ~~Refreshments~~in ~~Unlimited~~shares as a percentage of the Company,’s ~~which~~total ~~owns~~shares ~~17.15%~~to increase as a result of the exercise of the Company'’s ~~issued~~authorities ~~share~~to ~~capital.~~purchase Mrits ~~Comenge~~own isshares, abut ~~director~~only to the extent that the resulting interest of Olive., together with any concert parties, in the shares of the Company did not then exceed 41.4289%.

~~The~~In ~~CCEP~~accordance ~~Board~~with ~~and~~UK ~~the~~Listing ~~Remuneration~~Rule ~~Committee Chairman~~6.4.2R, ~~John~~copies ~~Bryant, are~~ of the ~~opinion~~resolutions that ~~the~~do ~~re-elections~~not ofconstitute Mrordinary ~~Arroyo~~business at an annual general meeting will be submitted to the National Storage Mechanism and Mrwill ~~Comenge~~shortly ~~are~~be ~~nonetheless~~available ~~appropriate~~for ~~because~~inspection at https://data.fca.org.uk/#/nsm/nationalstoragemechanism.

•Their re-elections would be compliant with the terms of reference of the Remuneration Committee, which stipulate that the committee must be composed of a majority of Independent Non-executive Directors (INEDs), including for quorum requirements (notwithstanding the presence of Mr Arroyo and Mr Comenge, the Remuneration Committee comprises a majority of INEDs).CONTACTS

~~•Although~~Company MrSecretariatSvetlana ~~Arroyo~~Walkersvetlana.walker@ccep.com ~~and~~Investor MrRelationsSarah ~~Comenge~~Willettsarah.willett@ccep.com ~~are~~Media ~~not~~RelationsShanna independent, they do not have any conflicts of interest and it is avoiding such conflicts that is the main purpose of prescribing that the members of the Remuneration Committee should be independent – in particular, to avoid any executive director being involved in decisions where a conflict of interest existsWendtmediaenquiries@ccep. com

~~•As~~ABOUT members of the Remuneration Committee, both Mr Arroyo and Mr Comenge can be expected to act to drive the long-term success of the Company for the benefit of all Shareholders, in the same way as the INEDs. CCEP

~~The~~Coca-Cola ~~CCEP~~Europacific ~~Board~~Partners ~~and~~is ~~management~~one ~~firmly~~of ~~believe~~the ~~this~~world’s ~~resolution~~leading isconsumer ingoods ~~the~~companies. ~~best~~We ~~interests~~make, move and sell some of ~~Shareholders~~the ~~and~~world’s ~~recommend~~most ~~voting~~loved ~~“FOR”~~brands ~~Resolutions~~– 7serving nearly 600 million consumers and 9,helping ~~consistent~~over ~~with~~4 ~~the~~million ~~recommendation~~customers ofacross ~~Glass~~31 ~~Lewis~~countries grow.

We ~~would~~combine bethe ~~glad~~strength toand ~~discuss~~scale ~~our~~of ~~recommendations~~a ~~in relation to Resolutions 7~~large, 9,multi-national ~~and~~business ~~25,~~with oran ~~any other resolution~~expert, ~~further~~local ~~with~~knowledge ~~you~~of ~~should~~the ~~you~~customers ~~wish.~~we Ifserve ~~you~~and ~~have~~communities ~~any~~we ~~questions or need assistance in submitting your proxy to vote your shares, please contact us at shareholders@ccep~~support.~~com.~~

~~Thank~~The ~~you~~Company ~~for~~is ~~your~~currently ~~support~~listed on Euronext Amsterdam, NASDAQ, London Stock Exchange and on the Spanish Stock Exchanges, and a constituent of both the NASDAQ 100 and FTSE 100 indices, trading under the symbol CCEP (ISIN No. GB00BDCPN049).

~~[4]~~For ~~ISS~~more ~~2026~~information ~~Proxy~~about ~~Analysis~~CCEP, &please ~~Benchmark~~visit ~~Policy~~www.cocacolaep.com ~~Voting~~and ~~Recommendations~~follow ~~for~~CCEP ~~Coca-Cola~~on ~~Europacific Partners plc.~~LinkedIn

SIGNATURE

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

	COCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC
		(Registrant)
Date: May 18, 2026	By:	/s/ Svetlana Walker
Date: May 29, 2026	By:	/s/ Svetlana Walker
	Name:	Svetlana Walker
	Title:	General Counsel & Company Secretary

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